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Abstract
Much of our everyday knowledge is risky. This not only includes personal judgments,
but the results of measurement, data obtained from references or by report, the
results of statistical testing, etc. There are two (often opposed) views in AI on how
to handle risky empirical knowledge. One view, characterized often by modal or
nonmonotonic logics, is that the structure of such knowledge should be captured
by the formal logical properties of a set of sentences, if we can just get the logic
right. The other view takes probability to be central to the characterization of risky
knowledge, but often does not allow for the tentative or corrigible acceptance of a
set of sentences. We examine a view, based on -acceptability that combines both
probability and modality. A statement is -accepted if the probability of its denial
is at most , where  is taken to be a xed small parameter as is customary in the
practice of statistical testing. We show that given a body of evidence  
Æ
, the set
of -accepted statements  

has exactly the logical structure of a classical modal
system EMN, the smallest classical modal logic E supplemented by the schemata
M: 2

(
p
 ^  
q
)! (2

 ^2

 ) and N: 2

>.
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1 Introduction
Certainly, a lot of what we consider knowledge is risky. \Do you know when the
next plane to L.A. leaves?" \Yes; 11:04; I just looked it up." You know that
it is raining; you just looked out the window and saw that it was. John knows
the length of the table; he just measured it and knows that it is 42:0  0:10
in. We know that of the next thousand births in this big hospital, at least 400
will be male. Since we just obtained evidence in the 0.01 rejection region, we
know that H
0
is false.
In general, particularly in the case of measurement, it seems unreasonable
to deny that statements like these, despite the fact that evidence can render
them no more than highly probable, can qualify as knowledge.
What is the logical structure of the set of conclusions that may be ob-
tained by nonmonotonic or inductive inference from a body of evidence? Is
it a deductively closed theory, something weaker, something stronger? We
make minimal assumptions about evidence, and take inductive inference to
be based on probability thresholding [11]. We show that the structure of the
set of inferred statements corresponds to a minimal modal logic, in which the
necessity operator is interpreted as \it is known that." This logic is not closed
under conjunction, but is otherwise normal.
Of course one may encounter the objection: \Well, you don't really know . . . ;
it is merely probable." But this is ingenuous or quibbling, unless there are
specic grounds for assigning a lower probability than that initially suggested.
We are interested in the objective risk of error. Our assessment of risk is
to be based on evidence, which in fact will include statistical knowledge (as
when we accept as \known" the approximate results of measurement). For
reasons discussed elsewhere [5], we must make a sharp distinction between the
set of sentences constituting the evidence, and the set of nonmonotonically
or inductively inferred sentences. The evidence itself may be uncertain, but
we shall suppose that it carries less risk of error than the risky knowledge we
derive from it. Let us take the set of sentences constituting the evidence to be
 
Æ
and the set of sentences constituting our risky knowledge  

, where Æ  .
The set of sentences  
Æ
may even have the same structure as  

, and in
turn may be derived from a set of less risky evidence statements  

. Such
a structure would allow the question of inductive or uncertain support or
justication to be raised at any level, but would not, of course require it.
We shall suppose that  
Æ
and  

are sets of sentences of a general rst order
language that includes means of referring to real numbers. In addition the
language will include statements whose interpretation is that \the proportion
of objects r(x) that are also t(x) lies between p and q." Finally, we shall
assume that  
Æ
, the set of evidential statements, is not empty, and that it
contains logical and mathematical truths.
Note that the small number \" is to be construed as a xed number,
rather than a variable that approaches a limit. Both Ernest Adams [1] and
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Judea Pearl [8] have sought to make a connection between high probability
and modal logic, but both have taken probabilities arbitrarily close to one as
corresponding to knowledge. In real life we do not have access to probabilities
arbitrarily close to one. Thus we have chosen to follow the model of hypothesis
testing in statistics: we reject a hypothesis (accept its complement) when the
chance of doing so erroneously is less than a xed nite amount.
2 The Sentences of  

We want our risky knowledge to be objectively justied by the evidence. We
shall interpret that to mean that the probability, relative to  
Æ
, that a state-
ment S in  

is false is to be no more than a xed value . We shall explain
loosely what we mean by \probability," state a number of its properties, and
then prove a number of theorems about the acceptability of statements in  

.
2.1 Probability
We will follow the treatment of probability in [6]. On this approach probability
is interval-valued, dened in a (two-sorted) rst order logic, relativized to
evidence, and based on known statistical frequencies. For example, given that
we know that between 70% and 80% of the balls in an urn are black, and that
we know nothing about the next ball to be drawn that indicates that it is
special in any way with respect to color, we would say that the probability of
the sentence \The next ball to be drawn is black," relative to what we know,
is [0.7,0.8]. Knowing that errors of measurement of length by method M are
normally distributed N(0:0; 0:02), and that a measurement of a yielded the
value 11.31, we can be 0.95 condent that the length of a lies between 11.27
and 11.35, i.e., the probability of \11:27  length(a)  11:35," is [0.95,0.95].
A test of a hypothesis of size  that yields a point in the rejection region
supports the denial of the null hypothesis H
0
to the degree [1  ; 1], or runs
a risk of error of at most .
We represent the probability of the statement S, given the background
knowledge  
Æ
by Prob(S; 
Æ
). There are a number of important facts about
probability as we construe it, that we will simply list here:
(i) Given a body of evidence  
Æ
, every statement S of our language has a
probability: there are p and q such that Prob(S; 
Æ
) = [p; q].
(ii) Probability is unique: If Prob(S; 
Æ
) = [p; q] and Prob(S; 
Æ
) = [r; s] then
p = r and q = s.
(iii) If S and T are known to have the same truth value, i.e., if the bicondi-
tional
p
S  T
q
is in  
Æ
, they have the same probability: If
p
S  T
q
2  
Æ
,
then Prob(S; 
Æ
) = Prob(T; 
Æ
).
4
4
We follow Quine [9] in using quasi-quotation (corners) to specify the forms of expressions
in our formal language. This
p
S  T
q
becomes a specic biconditional expression on the
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(iv) If Prob(S; 
Æ
) = [p; q], then Prob(
p
:S
q
; 
Æ
) = [1  q; 1  p]. The proba-
bility of the negation of a statement is determined by the probability of
the statement itself.
(v) If S entails T , i.e., if S ` T , Prob(S; 
Æ
) = [p
S
; q
S
] and Prob(T; 
Æ
) =
[p
T
; q
T
] then p
S
 p
T
and q
S
 q
T
.
(vi) If S 2  
Æ
, then Prob(S; 
Æ
) = [1; 1]; If
p
:S
q
2  
Æ
, then Prob(S; 
Æ
) =
[0; 0].
(vii) The semantics underlying probability reect known relative frequencies,
though the actual probability interval of a statement may be the cover
of several frequency intervals.
2.2 The Syntax of -acceptability
It is natural to suggest that it is worth accepting a statement S as known if
there is only a negligible chance that it is wrong. Put in terms of probability,
we might say that it is reasonable to accept a statement in  

when the
maximum probability of its denial relative to what we take as evidence,  
Æ
, is
less than or equal to . This suggests the following denition of  

, our body
of risky knowledge, in terms of our evidence  
Æ
:
Denition 2.1  

= fS : 9p; q (Prob(
p
:S
q
; 
Æ
) = [p; q] ^ q  )g.
We stipulate that a sentence belongs to the set of statements accepted at
level  when the maximum chance of its being wrong (q) is less than or equal
to our tolerance for error, . This reects | and is in part motivated by |
the theory of testing statistical hypotheses.
A few easy theorems will establish some important facts about the struc-
ture of  

. First we restate Denition 2.1 in a more positive form, making use
of property (iv) of probability in Section 2.1:
Theorem 2.2 S 2  

 9p; q (Prob(S; 
Æ
) = [p; q] ^ p  1  ).
An important fact concerning the use of inference in  

is captured by the
following theorem:
Theorem 2.3 If S 2  

and S ` T and S ` T
0
then T ^ T
0
2  

.
Proof. This follows from property (v) of probability in Section 2.1, together
with the principle that if S ` T and S ` T
0
, then S ` T ^ T
0
. 2
But we do not have adjunction in general:
Theorem 2.4 It is possible that S 2  

and T 2  

but
p
S ^ T
q
=2  

.
Proof. The probability of S and of T may each exceed 1   , while the
probability of their conjunction does not. 2
replacement of S and T by specic formulas of the language.
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The fact that we do not in general have adjunction may strike some people
as disastrous. After all, adjunction is a basic form of inference. In mitigation,
we point out that Theorem 2.3 shows that there are cases in which we clearly
do have adjunction. What is required is that the items that are to be adjoined
be derivable from a single statement that is itself acceptable.
When do we call on adjunction? When we have an argument that pro-
ceeds from a list of premises to a conclusion. This is convenient, and may be
perspicuous, but is not essential; the same conclusion could be derived from
the conjunction of the premises without using adjunction. Where it makes
a dierence is where the premises are individually supported by empirical
evidence. But in this case the persuasiveness of the argument depends in
part on the empirical support given to the conjunction of the premises. Too
many premises, each only just acceptable, will not provide good support for
a conclusion even when the conclusion does validly follow from the premises.
For example, from \Cow #1 shows no unusual symptoms" and \If a cow
shows no unusual symptoms then she will have a normal calf," one may infer
\Cow #1 will have a normal calf." From a thousand sets of premises of that
form, one may validly infer (making use of adjunction) that all thousand of the
cows will have normal calves. But while the inference is valid, the conclusion is
not one that should be believed. Why should the conclusion not be believed?
Because while the generalization will almost always be upheld by events, and
so should be accepted, it will on rare occasions lead us astray.
Furthermore, note that although the conclusion about the thousand cows
should not be believed, there is no particular premise that should be rejected.
For a more complete discussion of adjunction and its role in logic, see [4].
To the extent that we are thinking of an argument as supporting its con-
clusion, any argument requires simultaneous (adjunctive) acceptance of its
premises. Any doubt that infects the conjunction of the premises rightly
throws a shadow on the conclusion. Except for notational convenience, any
argument may be taken to have a single premise.
Many more people seem to have doubts about deductive closure than have
doubts about conjunction. It is worth noting the connection between adjunc-
tion and deductive closure expressed by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.5 If  is not empty and contains the rst order consequences of
any statement in it, then  is closed under conjunction if and only if  is
deductively closed.
3 Minimal Modal Logics
Following up an idea of Richard Montague and Dana Scott [10,7], Brian Chel-
las [3] eshed out the idea of a \minimal modal logic." Since then, Arlo-
Costa [2] has arrived at some interesting results concerning Barcan formulas
in a rst order modal logic, using the same models. We will follow Arlo-Costa
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in referring to the models underlying these logics as \neighborhood models."
Our concerns here however will be restricted to the propositional case.
Let us rst describe the terminology for minimal modal logics. We will
denote by 2 and 3 the necessity and possibility operators, and P the set of
propositional constants.
Denition 3.1 A tuple M = hW;N; j=i is a neighborhood model i
(i) W is a set [worlds].
(ii) N :W ! 2
2
W
is a function fromW to sets of sets of worlds [neighborhood
function].
(iii) j= is a function W  P ! f0; 1g [truth assignment function].
In this formulation, sentences are identied with sets of worlds. A sentence
is represented by the maximal set of worlds in which it is true. A set of
sentences is thus represented as a set of sets of worlds.
Informally, in a neighborhood model, for each world w 2 W , there is an
associated neighborhood N(w) (given by the neighborhood function N) that
consists of a set of sentences. The neighborhood of a world contains the set
of sentences that are \necessary" at that world.
We will extend j= to denote the valuation function of the model M, and
write w j=
M
 if the sentence  is true at the world w. In addition to the
usual rules governing the truth of compound formulas, we have the following
regarding the modal formulas.
Denition 3.2 Given a model M = hW;N; j=i and a formula , the truth
set of  in M, denoted by jjjj
M
, is given by
jjjj
M
= fw 2 W : w j=
M
g:
The truth of modal formulas at a world w 2 W is dened as follows.
w j=
M
2 i jjjj
M
2 N(w)
w j=
M
3 i jj:jj
M
62 N(w)
The truth set of a formula contains all the worlds in which it is true.
Recall that the neighborhood N(w) of the world w contains all the sentences
(represented by sets of worlds) that are necessary at w. Thus, the modal
formula 2 is true at w i the truth set of  is contained in N(w).
Similarly, the formula 3 is true at w i the truth set of the negation of
 is not contained in N(w). This corresponds to the conventional notion that
the two modal operators are interdenable: 3  :2:.
4 Knowledge as -acceptability
So far we have been calling the two modal operators the necessity and possibil-
ity operators. However, there can be other interpretations of these operators;
they can be construed epistemically or deontically. For example, 2 may be
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identied with the notion of belief, obligation, or requirements. The interpre-
tation we are interested in is knowledge construed as -acceptability. In this
case, 2 is interpreted as that  is \known". A bit more precisely, given a
set of evidence  
Æ
and a threshold , 2

 corresponds to  2  

, and 3


corresponds to : 62  

. In other words,
Denition 4.1
2

 : Prob(; 
Æ
) = [p; q] and p  1  ;
3

 : Prob(; 
Æ
) = [p; q] and q > :
4.1 Constraints on the Neighborhood
Consider the axiom schema
(3) 3$ :2:,
and the rule of inference
(RE)
$  
2$ 2 
.
A modal system is called classical i it contains the axiom schema (3) and
is closed under the rule of inference (RE). The modal system E, consisting of
(3) and (RE), is the smallest classical modal logic.
Theorem 4.2 2

is classical.
Proof. This follows from denition 4.1, and property (iii) of probability in
Section 2.1. 2
There are three conditions on neighborhood models that are of interest
to us. Given a neighborhood model M = hW;N; j=i, for any world w 2 W
and formulas  and  , let us dene the following conditions (we follow Arlo-
Costa [2]).
(m) If
p
 ^  
q
2 N(w), then  2 N(w) and  2 N(w).
(c) If  2 N(w) and  2 N(w), then
p
 ^  
q
2 N(w):
(n) W 2 N(w).
These conditions correspond to the following schemata. (The symbol > de-
notes the truth constant.)
(M) 2

(
p
 ^  
q
)! (2

 ^2

 ).
(C) (2

 ^ 2

 )! 2

(
p
 ^  
q
).
(N) 2

>.
That is, the schema (M) is valid in the class of neighborhood models that
satisfy (m), and similarly for (C) and (N).
4.2 The Modal System for -Acceptability
Recall that E is the smallest classical modal logic. A family of distinct classical
minimal logics can be obtained by adopting in addition dierent combinations
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of the three axiom schemas (M), (C), and (N). We will denote such systems
by their lists of axioms. For example, EMC is the classical system containing
the schemas (M) and (C).
Among this family of modal logics, the one that is of particular interest
to us is the system EMN. The following theorem establishes a link between
EMN, a classical minimal logic, and  

, a system of -acceptability.
Theorem 4.3 Given a body of evidence  
Æ
and a threshold , 2

satises the
modal system EMN.
Proof. EMN is the minimal modal system with the axiom schemas (3),
(M), and (N), and a single rule of inference (RE). By Theorem 4.2, 2

is
classical. Property (v) of probability in Section 2.1 yields M and N, provided
 
Æ
is not empty. 2
Note however, the axiom schema (C) is not valid in  

. Intuitively this
corresponds to the rejection of adjunction. The conjunction of two -accepted
formulas may itself have a probability that is not high enough to warrant
admittance into  

, as mentioned in Theorem 2.4.
5 Conclusion
What is interesting about the results we have just presented is that they
provide a reconciliation between an approach to knowledge in terms of proba-
bilistic acceptance, and an approach to knowledge in terms of modal epistemic
logics. We have shown that the same structure emerges when viewed in each
way.
We have taken the set of evidence statements,  
Æ
, for granted. Presumably,
this set of statements can be construed as risky, too. Note that, unless one is
seeking \`ultimate" justication (whatever that may be) there is no dangerous
circularity in this procedure. Given any degree of riskiness , we can ask for
and receive objective justication of the statements in  

, in terms of a less
risky set of statements  
Æ
.  
Æ
in turn can be questioned; this amounts to
treating  
Æ
as derived from some even less risky set of statements  

. And the
same can be asked of  

. That this can always be done provides us with all
the non-circular objectivity we need. That it does provide us with objectivity
is a consequence of the objectivity of probability as we construe it in [6].
In practise, of course, we can be perfectly satised with a body of evi-
dence  
Æ
of some specied degree of maximal riskiness. What concerns us in
practise is the question of whether that evidence provides adequate support
for sentences in  

, the corpus of practical certainties we use for making deci-
sions and calculating expectations. Many of these practical certainties will be
the relative frequency statements we need for grounding probabilities. Again,
there need be no circularity.
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